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In 2006, nearly 6,000 mumps cases were reported in 
the United States, 795 of which occurred in Illinois. In Chi-
cago, 1 healthcare institution experienced ongoing trans-
mission for 4 weeks. This study examines the outbreak 
epidemiology and quantiﬁ  es the ﬁ  nancial affect on this or-
ganization. This retrospective cohort study was conducted 
through case and exposure identiﬁ  cation, interviews, medi-
cal record reviews, and immunologic testing of blood speci-
mens. Nine mumps cases resulted in 339 exposures, 325 
(98%) among employees. During initial investigation, 186 
(57%) of the exposed employees had evidence of mumps 
immunity. Physicians made up the largest group of noncom-
pliers (55%) with mumps immunity testing. The cost to the 
institution was $262,788 or $29,199 per mumps case. The 
outbreak resulted in substantial stafﬁ  ng and ﬁ  nancial chal-
lenges for the institution that may have been minimized with 
readily accessible electronic employee vaccination records 
and adherence to infection control recommendations.   
Mumps, a highly contagious illness caused by a 
paramyxovirus, causes inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms and sali-
vary gland swelling. Although rare, complications may 
include encephalitis, meningitis, orchitis, and oophoritis. 
The virus replicates within the upper respiratory tract and 
is transmitted through direct contact with respiratory drop-
lets or saliva and through fomites. The incubation period 
ranges from 12 to 25 days; persons who contract mumps 
are considered infectious from 3 days before symptoms ap-
pear through 9 days after symptoms appear. Although no 
speciﬁ  c treatment exists, the disease is preventable through 
use of measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine usually 
provided to children ≈1 year of age with a booster dose 
administered before children start school. Clinical diagno-
sis is conﬁ  rmed by laboratory testing that includes culture, 
serologic analysis, or real-time reverse transcription–PCR 
(RT-PCR) (1,2).
During January 1–October 7, 2006, 45 states reported 
5,783 conﬁ  rmed or probable cases to the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC). Six states, including Il-
linois, were responsible for 84% of reported cases. Mumps 
is generally more common among unvaccinated children, 
but nationally this outbreak occurred primarily among 
college-age persons (3). In Chicago, reported mumps cases 
began to increase in March 2006. By the end of the year, 
the Chicago Department of Public Health had 73 conﬁ  rmed 
and probable cases. More of these cases were in an older 
age group (20–29 years) than was nationally observed (4).
Most healthcare worker (HCW) cases were concentrat-
ed in 1 hospital, Northwestern Memorial Hospital (NMH), 
Chicago Illinois, USA, which experienced ongoing trans-
mission during April 23–May 23, 2006. The situation cre-
ated resource and economic challenges to the organization. 
We examine the control and effects of this outbreak in a 
tertiary care center.
Methods
Clinical Setting and Patient Population
NMH is an 825-bed academic medical center. All adult 
patient care rooms are single occupancy; the neonatal in-
tensive care unit (ICU) is multiple occupancy with 8 nurs-
eries each housing 4–12 isolettes (self-contained incubator 
units, total of 67 isolettes). The patient cohort comprised all 
mumps case-patients and persons exposed to them at NMH 
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during April 23–May 23, 2006. The NMH Institutional Re-
view Board approved this study.
Deﬁ  nitions
According to CDC, a clinical case of mumps is de-
ﬁ  ned as acute onset of unilateral or bilateral tender, self-
limited swelling of the parotid or other salivary glands 
lasting >2 days without other apparent cause. Conﬁ  rmed 
cases are either laboratory conﬁ  rmed or meet the clinical 
case deﬁ  nition and are epidemiologically linked to a con-
ﬁ  rmed or probable case. Probable cases meet the clinical 
case deﬁ  nition but are neither laboratory conﬁ  rmed nor 
epidemiologically linked to another conﬁ  rmed or probable 
case. Two probable cases that are epidemiologically linked 
are considered conﬁ  rmed, even in the absence of labora-
tory conﬁ  rmation (3,5). An exposure is deﬁ  ned as being 
within 3 feet of a person with mumps without use of appro-
priate personal protective equipment (6). A close contact 
is a visitor or family member exposed to a person with a 
conﬁ  rmed or probable case. Persons are considered to have 
mumps immunity if they have documentation of receipt of 
2 doses of mumps-containing vaccine, positive mumps im-
munoglobulin (Ig) G serologic results, or documentation 
of physician-diagnosed mumps (4,7). Persons with mumps 
serologies in the indeterminate range are considered non-
immune.
Outbreak Investigation
The NMH Infection Control and Prevention Depart-
ment (IC) investigated all mumps cases in an attempt to 
identify the index case and all persons who were exposed. 
Case-patients were placed in airborne infection isolation, 
as were exposed, nonimmune patients during their incuba-
tion period. Upon hospital discharge, case-patients and ex-
posed patients were instructed to follow-up with the NMH 
Infectious Diseases Clinic (ID) or their primary care physi-
cians. Similarly, patients discharged before recognition of 
exposure were contacted and referred to either ID or their 
primary care physician. IC sometimes needed to assign a 
provisional case status and to recommend a disposition be-
fore laboratory results were known. All cases were reported 
to the jurisdictional local health departments, and NMH 
provisional case status was retrospectively compared with 
the ﬁ  nal case status assigned by the health departments.
According to NMH policy, all employees with com-
municable work-related illnesses or exposures are evalu-
ated in the Corporate Health Department (CH). During this 
outbreak, employees with illnesses consistent with mumps 
were evaluated, furloughed through day 9 of their illness, 
and cleared by CH before returning to work. Ill employees 
were paid either through Workers’ Compensation (WC) af-
ter the ﬁ  rst 3 days, for which employees are required by the 
Illinois State Workers’ Compensation Commission to use 
personal time off, or through the Short Term Injury and 
Illness Plan. Exposed employees were paid through a fur-
lough account established by NMH during days 12–25 of 
the incubation period if nonimmune or while awaiting se-
rologic test results. Employee compensation was managed 
through the NMH WC and Human Resources (HR) depart-
ments. Close contacts were referred to ID where immunity 
was determined at no charge to them.
Infection control data were collected through inter-
views and medical record review. Patient data were ob-
tained from electronic medical records and employee data 
from written medical charts. Data included name, job title 
for employees; hospital location; exposure source for cas-
es; and immunologic status, including previous receipt of 
MMR vaccine, history of mumps, and mumps serologic 
result with laboratory test date.
Vaccine Program
Before 2003, only measles and rubella vaccination 
were routinely recorded in employee health records; 
thus, mumps vaccination status was often unavailable. 
To quickly assess mumps immunity during this outbreak, 
an intranet survey was created (SurveyMonkey, Portland, 
OR, USA) and made available to all employees. CH per-
sonnel reviewed survey results; results were not corrobo-
rated during the outbreak because of time constraints. To 
facilitate evaluation, counseling, and vaccination, nonim-
mune employees were seen either in CH, the Northwest-
ern Medical Faculty Foundation Travel Medicine and Im-
munization Center, or in 1 of 2 satellite clinics established 
for this outbreak. Staff were classiﬁ  ed as either high-risk 
caregivers (HRCs), low-risk caregivers (LRCs) or non-
caregivers (NCs) to allow vaccine prioritization. HRCs 
were those who worked in areas where mumps cases were 
located or worked with pregnant or immunosuppressed 
patients. LRCs were persons who cared for patients in 
other inpatient or outpatient areas. To conserve resources, 
NCs were encouraged to seek evaluation with their pri-
mary care physicians but were not turned away if they 
sought evaluation at an NMH location.
Laboratory Evaluation
NMH’s Immunology Laboratory performs mumps 
qualitative IgG antibody testing. Although most tests were 
performed in house, because of a low manufacturer’s sup-
ply of test kits, patient IgG testing was sent to a reference 
laboratory, and in-house testing was reserved for employ-
ees who were within 4 days of furlough. Turnaround time 
for the in-house test was decreased from 72 to 24 hours, 
and stafﬁ  ng was increased on weekends throughout the 
outbreak to ensure timeliness of test results. Reference 
laboratory turnaround time was 1–3 days. NMH’s Referred 
Testing Department sent serum to a reference laboratory 
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for IgM and IgG antibody testing and buccal swabs to the 
Illinois Department of Public Health for RT-PCR.
Financial Effects and Data Analysis
 The ﬁ  nancial effects were determined by tabulating 
the cost of personnel assistance and resource use. The cost 
of personnel assistance (i.e., lost productivity) was system-
atically provided by departmental leaders after the investi-
gation. A total dollar value was assigned each department 
by estimating the time spent by each employee on outbreak 
and exposure management. The cost for resources, repre-
sented by exact dollar amounts, includes medical evalu-
ations, vaccines, laboratory evaluations, and employee 
compensation. Data for personnel assistance were stratiﬁ  ed 
by department and aggregated to provide a total estimate. 
Data for resources were stratiﬁ  ed by type of activity and 
aggregated to provide a total cost. Additionally, an estimate 
of the cost of maintaining a routine 2-dose MMR vaccina-
tion program and adequate employee medical records was 
calculated to compare with the cost of the outbreak. Data 
from 2008 were used for this calculation because 2008 
was the ﬁ  rst year NMH had complete ﬁ  nancial records for 
the 2-dose MMR vaccination program. Financial data are 
rounded to the nearest dollar amount.
Results
Outbreak Investigation
Nine mumps cases occurred at NMH, 7 among em-
ployees and 2 among inpatients (Table 1). Six were pri-
mary and 3 were secondary cases (Figure 1). Eight cases 
were symptomatic. Eight case-patients were women; the 
average age of all case-patients was 34 years (range 26–39 
years). Two had documented receipt of 2 MMR vaccines, 2 
had positive IgM serologic results, and none had documen-
tation of prior mumps infection. Retrospectively, jurisdic-
tional health departments assigned case status as follows: 
4 conﬁ  rmed, 3 probable, and 2 that could not be conﬁ  rmed 
because even though both had clinical symptoms, 1 had 
negative laboratory results and the other had no known his-
tory of exposure.
During the outbreak, 339 persons (325 employees and 
14 close contacts) were reported as having been exposed to 
a person with mumps, resulting in an average of 38 expo-
sures per case (Figure 2). Of the 325 employees, 186 (57%) 
were deemed immune: 16 (9%) with documented physi-
cian-diagnosed mumps, 14 (7%) with documented receipt 
of 2 doses of mumps-containing vaccine, and 156 (84%) 
with prior laboratory evidence of immunity. None of these 
employees required time off work because of the timely re-
porting of their mumps immune status. The remaining 139 
(43%) employees required laboratory testing for immunity. 
Of these, 63 (45%) underwent testing, with serologic re-
sults as follows: 33 (52%) positive, 11 (18%) equivocal, 
and 19 (30%) negative. Overall, 219 (88%) of the 249 
HCWs evaluated were immune to mumps. The remaining 
76 (55%) employees who required testing for mumps im-
munity did not comply with CH evaluation (Figure 3). Of 
these persons, physicians made up 55%; registered nurses 
(RNs), 29%; unit staff, 13%; and nonunit staff, 3%. Four-
teen close contacts required laboratory testing for mumps 
immunity, and all were immune.
A total of 59 employees were absent from work for 
282 days for reasons that included having mumps, being 
nonimmune, and awaiting symptom evaluation or labora-
tory test results (Table 2). Employee time off work ranged 
from 1 to 24 days (average 5 days). RNs accounted for 
most of the work absences (n = 25, 42%) and took off the 
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Table 1. Epidemiology of 9 mumps cases, Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2006* 
Serologic test results  Case
no.
Patient
age, y/sex 
No. MMR vaccine 
doses received  Clinical signs 
Date of symptom 
onset IgM IgG
DoH case 
disposition
1 35/F 1 Fatigue, unilateral facial 
swelling 
Apr 24  – + Not a case 
2 30/F  0 Fever, chills, stiff neck, bilateral 
facial swelling 
May 5  – + Not a case 
3 26/F 2 Fatigue, fever, headache, stiff 
neck, bilateral facial swelling 
May 12  IND + Probable
4 39/F 0 Headache, sore throat, stiff 
neck, myalgias, bilateral facial 
swelling 
May 15  + IND Confirmed
5 38/F 0 Flu-like illness, bilateral facial 
swelling 
May 19  – + Probable
6 30/F 0 Headache, sore throat, 
myalgias,  tender 
submandibular nodes 
May 19  – + Probable
7 26/F 2 Sore throat, headache, bilateral 
facial swelling 
May 22  – + Confirmed
8 44/F 1 Bilateral facial swelling  May 22  – + Confirmed
9 35/M 0 Asymptomatic May  23  + + Confirmed
*MMR, measles, mumps, rubella; Ig, immunoglobulin; DoH, Department of Health; –, negative; +, positive; IND, indeterminate. Effects of Mumps Outbreak in Hospital
most days (94 days, 33%), followed by resident physicians 
(49 days, 17%). Furlough was the most used type of time 
off, with 229 days (81%), primarily for nonimmunity (178 
days, 78%) followed by furlough awaiting serologic test 
results (51 days, 22%).
During April 1–June 31, 2006, 416 mumps IgG serolo-
gies were performed at NMH; 58 IgM and 207 IgG sero-
logic results were sent to a reference laboratory. Twenty-
nine buccal swabs were sent to the Illinois State Laboratory 
for mumps RT-PCR, and only 2 were positive, both from 
outpatients unrelated to the institutional outbreak.
Vaccine Program
Of the 6,600 NMH employees, 5,150 (78%) completed 
the intranet survey to assess their mumps immunity (Fig-
ure 4). Of these, 1,560 (30%) were HRCs and 3,590 (70%) 
were LRCs or NCs. Ninety-one percent of HRCs and 74% 
of LRCs and NCs completed the survey. Of the HRCs 
who completed the survey, 699 (45%) required additional 
follow-up; however, only 355 (51%) complied. Of those 
who complied, 228 (64%) received vaccination. In com-
parison, 1,072 (30%) LRCs and NCs required additional 
follow-up, and 386 (36%) complied. Of these, 223 (58%) 
received vaccination. Overall, 127 (36%) of HRCs and 163 
(42%) of LRCs or NCs either declined or did not require 
vaccination. The average time for employee evaluation in 
CH was 30–45 minutes, and the 2 satellite clinics operated 
for 177 hours. From April 20 through September 1, 2006, 
CH administered a total of 755 MMR vaccinations, 451 to 
survey participants.
Financial Effects
The estimated cost of personnel assistance during the 
mumps outbreak was $66,432, led by IC at $36,746 (55%) 
(Table 3). The largest contribution from a hospital unit 
was the neonatal ICU at $6,624 (10%). The actual cost of 
resources was $196,356. The largest resource contribu-
tors were HR resulting from compensation for employee 
time off work at $91,318 (47%) and CH at $56,256 (27%) 
from time required for medical record review. The total 
cost of the outbreak was $262,788, representing a 3:1 ratio 
of resource to personnel costs. Cost per mumps case was 
$29,199.
In comparison, in 2008 maintaining a routine 2-dose 
MMR vaccination program and adequate employee medi-
cal records cost ≈$66,025. This ﬁ  gure represents the annual 
number of new employees (n = 978), all of whom required 
a $30 medical record review and the annual number of 
MMR vaccinations given (n = 667) at $55 each. Thus, the 
cost of controlling the mumps outbreak was 4× the cost of 
maintaining a routine MMR prevention program.
Discussion
Transmission of mumps can occur within hospitals, 
but outbreaks with secondary transmission such as the 
one at NMH are rarely reported (8,9). One of the most 
widely reported incidents of nosocomial transmission oc-
curred during a community mumps outbreak in Tennessee 
in 1986–1987 (8). Although only a small number of cases 
were nosocomially transmitted, this in-hospital outbreak il-
lustrates the threat that mumps and other illnesses can pose 
to patients and HCWs (8,10).
Although investigators have quantiﬁ  ed the impact of 
nosocomial mumps outbreaks, in-depth analysis of resource 
use during a large-scale nosocomial mumps outbreak has 
not been published (9,11). Analysis of this outbreak as-
signed a cost for the resources used and the personnel af-
fected. Most of the resource cost was attributable to HR 
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Figure 1. Epidemiology of 9 mumps cases at Northwestern Memorial 
Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, April 23–May 23, 2006. Black bars, 
community-acquired cases among staff members; white bars, 
community-acquired cases among patients; red bars, secondary 
cases among staff members; blue bars, presumed work-related 
cases among staff members; CT1, ﬁ  rst chain of transmission; CT2, 
second chain of transmission.
156(84%)positive
serologictestresults
19(30%)nonimmune onthebasis
ofnegativeserologictestresults
186(57%)immune
325employeeexposures
14(100%)immuneonthebasis
ofpositiveserologictestresults
14closecontactexposures
139(43%)requiredserologictesting
16(9%)physicianͲ
documentedmumps
14(7%)vaccination
63(45%)testedforimmunity 76(55%)nottestedor
noresultsavailable
33(52%)immuneonthebasis
ofpositiveserologictestresults
11(18%)nonimmune onthebasisof
indeterminateserologictestresults
9mumpscaseͲpatients
(7employees,2patients)
Figure 2. Immune status results among employees and close 
contacts exposed to 9 persons who had mumps, Northwestern 
Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2006. For those deemed 
immune, immunity is grouped based on historical documentation 
of serologic status, mumps infection, or vaccination. All others 
were required to report for serologic testing during the outbreak; 
for those who complied with the required testing, immune status 
is provided.RESEARCH
for compensation for staff work absences and to CH for 
employee health record review. Additionally, personnel 
most affected were from IC and from the neonatal ICU, the 
inpatient unit requiring the most stafﬁ  ng substitutions. In 
comparison, a nosocomial mumps outbreak in Utah in 1996 
reported the total cost of the outbreak in an inpatient pedi-
atric facility was $3,140, substantially lower than our cost 
(9). Examination of these 2 outbreaks, however, indicates 
that they are not comparable. The Utah facility was much 
smaller than NMH (45 vs 825 beds), had fewer staff, and 
had only 2 cases. The smaller work environment and mag-
nitude of the outbreak posed less opportunity for exposure 
to an infected person and required far fewer resources for 
outbreak control. In contrast, a neonatal ICU outbreak of 
infection with respiratory syncytial virus, an illness spread 
through a similar route, involving 9 infants was reported 
to have cost >$1.15 million (12). Although the number of 
cases is similar to ours, the increased cost of the outbreak of 
infection with respiratory syncyntial virus reﬂ  ects the need 
for intensive care and expensive postexposure prophylaxis 
(12). These discrepancies highlight the need for organiza-
tions to conduct and report detailed disease-speciﬁ  c analy-
ses to assist similar institutions planning for resource use 
during outbreak prevention and control.
At NMH, the lack of complete and easily retrievable 
employee health records contributed substantially to the 
overall outbreak cost. Until recently, only documentation 
of rubella and measles immunity was required and mumps 
immune status was often not recorded; additionally, vac-
cination information was not available electronically. Dur-
ing the outbreak, the need to rapidly evaluate the mumps 
immunity of our workforce would have required review of 
>6,000 employee health records, a task not deemed practi-
cal to prevent ongoing disease transmission and excessive 
employee furlough. This challenge led to development of 
an electronic survey to query employees about their mumps 
immunity. Although obviously suboptimal, this approach 
allowed CH to focus on record review for employees who 
either did not know their status or did not respond to the 
survey and to manage the ongoing vaccine campaign. 
This situation is not unique to NMH. Analysis of previous 
mumps outbreaks identiﬁ  ed complete and easily retriev-
able employee vaccination records as an integral step in 
reducing the resource and ﬁ  nancial costs to the hospital 
(8,9,13,14). If employee health information was complete 
and accessible, more than one fourth of our outbreak cost 
might have been averted.
Vaccination of HCWs is vital to mumps outbreak 
prevention. Although numerous outbreaks have occurred 
in populations with only 1-dose vaccine coverage, the na-
tional mumps outbreak of 2006 occurred during the high-
est 2-dose vaccine coverage in the United States at 87%, 
making this the ﬁ  rst large-scale national mumps outbreak 
associated with 2-dose vaccine failure. The estimated 
herd immunity threshold for mumps ranges from 88% to 
92%, and during the outbreak at NMH, 88% of our evalu-
ated workforce reported mumps immunity. The experi-
ence nationally and at our institution supports the concept 
that an increased level of group-speciﬁ  c immunity may 
be required to prevent transmission in settings in which 
close or prolonged contact occurs, particularly in crowd-
ed conditions, such as those within healthcare institutions 
(9,13,15). The possibility of vaccine failure highlights the 
need to maximize immunity among HCWs with 2 doses 
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Figure 3. Mumps immunity status and compliance among employees, 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2006. 
Black bars, no. employees with history of immunity; white bars, no. 
employees who complied with required antibody titer testing; red 
bars, no. employees who did not comply with required antibody 
titer testing; black line, percentage of employees in compliance. 
Unit staff consisted of nurse managers, secretaries, patient care 
technicians, clinical coordinators, and emergency department 
assistants; nonunit staff consisted of applications analysts, 
counselors, radiographers, resource coordinators, respiratory 
therapists, records specialists, safety technicians, patient escorts, 
housekeeping workers, and food services workers. 
5,150(78%)employeescompletedsurvey
1,560(30%)highͲriskcaregivers 3,590(70%)lowͲriskornoncaregivers
699(45%)required
corporatehealthfollowͲup
861(55%)selfͲreported
immunity
355(51%)received
followͲup
344(49%)didnot
receivefollowͲup
228(64%)
vaccinated
127(36%)declined
ordidnotrequire
vaccination
1,072(30%)required
corporatehealthfollowͲup
2,518(70%)selfͲ
reportedimmunity
386(36%)received
followͲup
686(64%)didnot
receivefollowͲup
223(58%)
vaccinated
163(42%)declined
ordidnotrequire
vaccination
   6,600employees
Figure 4. Survey results of self-reported mumps immunity among 
workforce, Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 
2006. Results are categorized by high-risk caregivers, those who 
worked in areas where mumps cases were located or worked 
with pregnant or immunosuppressed patient populations; low-
risk caregivers, those who cared for patients in other inpatient or 
outpatient areas; or noncaregivers. Compliance with corporate 
health evaluation and vaccination for those who did not report 
immunity are also shown.Effects of Mumps Outbreak in Hospital
of MMR vaccine and to address the age of administration 
of an MMR booster or the addition of a third vaccine dose 
to prevent future outbreaks (13–15).
Our outbreak highlights the inaccuracies that can exist 
in mumps case recognition, resulting in both underestima-
tion and overestimation of disease. Cases can be underes-
timated because patients are contagious for days before 
symptoms appear, and up to one third of patients never 
develop symptoms but can still spread disease. Notably, 1 
exposed, asymptomatic employee underwent IgG and IgM 
testing and was positive for IgM. Fortunately, no secondary 
cases are known to have resulted from exposure to this per-
son. In addition, overestimation can occur when presump-
tive case status is assigned on the basis of clinical presen-
tation before laboratory results are available. At NMH, 2 
probable cases could not be conﬁ  rmed by the health depart-
ments. These cases led to additional exposure evaluations. 
Although prompt initiation of infection control measures is 
vital to control a mumps outbreak, investigators should be 
aware of the challenges in accurate case recognition.
The lack of laboratory resources also increased the 
cost of the outbreak. The on-site laboratory testing facil-
ity required increased stafﬁ  ng to complete timely serologic 
testing and later had a shortage of testing kits. The need 
to send specimens to a reference laboratory delayed test 
results and led to assignment of presumptive case status 
on the basis of symptoms resulting in potentially unnec-
essary exposure evaluations. In addition, the hospital had 
to furlough exposed employees whose immune status was 
unknown until serologic results were available.
The lack of compliance with IC recommendations for 
exposure evaluation and vaccination was evident primarily 
among physicians. This reaction was similar to that dur-
ing a mumps outbreak in 1987 at the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange in which the intense nature and competitiveness 
of the profession encouraged employees to work while ill 
(16). The reasons for lack of compliance at NMH, particu-
larly among physicians, are unknown, but the urgent nature 
of the profession is expected to have played a major role. 
That some employees minimized the risk for exposure or 
thought the follow-up process was too cumbersome also 
has been speculated. Another ﬁ  nding was the discovery of 
a few persons who claimed exposure to beneﬁ  t from time 
off work. Cooperation between CH, IC, WC, and HR led to 
detection and management of these rare instances.
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Table 3. Financial effects of mumps outbreak, Northwestern 
Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2006* 
Type of expense and department  Cost, US$* 
Personnel
 Human  resources  1,066
  Infection control and prevention  36,746
 Laboratories  7,312
 Medical  administration  1,500
 Nursing  units  10,808
 Patient  escort  1,200
 Risk  management  300
  Environmental and occupational safety  7,500
Total personnel cost  66,432
Resources 
 Corporate  health  56,256
  Human resources employee compensation  91,318
  Infectious diseases clinic  1,000
 Laboratories  6,842
  Travel medicine and immunization center  2,240
 Vaccination  program  38,700
Total resource cost  196,356
Total cost to hospital  262,788
*Rounded to the nearest dollar. 
Table 2. Characteristics of employee work absences during mumps outbreak, Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, USA,
2006*
Type of time off  Job title  No. employees  Days allowed 
PTO Registered nurse 1 3
Patient escort 1 2
Short-term injury and illness plan  Unit secretary  1 6
WC Patient care technician  1 24
Registered nurse 1 10
WC and PTO  Registered nurse  2 8
Furlough
  Because of nonimmunity  Registered nurse  9 48
Physician 5 49
Unit staff† 9 42
Nonunit staff‡ 7 39
  Because of pending titer results  Registered nurse  12 25
Unit staff 8 20
Nonunit staff 2 6
Total 59 282
*PTO, personal time off; WC, workers’ compensation 
†Nurse managers, secretaries, patient care technicians, clinical coordinators, emergency department assistants. 
‡Applications analyst, counselor, radiographer, resource coordinator, respiratory therapist, records specialist, safety technician, patient escort, 
environmental services, food services. RESEARCH
When examining the types of employee compensation 
provided, an inherent inequality was established. Ill em-
ployees were not fully compensated for their work absence 
(67% of the employee’s average weekly wage after taking 3 
days of personal time off). These employees were required 
to take WC, and the rate of compensation is set accord-
ing to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (www.state.
il.us/Agency/IIC/act.pdf). In contrast, exposed employees 
were compensated by a system speciﬁ  cally established for 
this outbreak by the hospital because WC will not cover 
such costs. These persons were compensated 100% of their 
salary. This unbalanced system of reimbursement may re-
quire reevaluation for future outbreaks so that ill persons do 
not feel penalized or fail to self-disclose illness.
This study has several limitations. First, recall bias 
may have occurred, particularly when departmental lead-
ers retrospectively estimated personnel costs. Second, the 
reliability of self-reported information obtained through 
interviews and the intranet survey regarding mumps immu-
nity was not validated during the outbreak and may have 
contributed to either overestimation or underestimation of 
mumps immunity in our workforce. Finally, the ﬁ  ndings of 
this study may not be generalizable because all healthcare 
institutions are unique environments.
We examined the effects of the 2006 national mumps 
outbreak within a healthcare institution. Our cost of 
>$262,000 makes a strong business case for healthcare or-
ganizations to improve infectious diseases prevention and 
control strategies. A comprehensive program that consists 
of maintaining complete electronic employee health re-
cords, identifying cases and employee exposures rapidly, 
enforcing compliance with infection control recommenda-
tions, and developing plans to alleviate laboratory short-
ages is of paramount importance for outbreak control. Re-
ports of detailed epidemiologic and ﬁ  nancial analyses of 
infectious disease outbreaks can facilitate emergency pre-
paredness and response planning for comparable healthcare 
organizations.
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